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Abstract
Along with the establishment of the Department of Public Health in 1912,
the implementation of public health policies became an integral part of city
management in Republican Guangzhou. Yet the cholera outbreak of 1932
fully exposed the weaknesses of the medical and sanitary infrastructure of the
city. Due to the Guangzhou government’s inaction, the Fangbian Hospital, a
local charitable hall founded in response to the bubonic plague of the 1890s,
involuntarily took over the major responsibility for providing medical services
for cholera patients in the early stage of the epidemic. Only after the death of
hundreds of patients and Guangzhou being described as a ‘world of horror’ in
the local press did the government-run hospital start to take a more active role.
Epidemics have always served as catalysts for change in public health perceptions
and practices. This paper attempts to explain how the cholera epidemic of 1932
changed the role of public health in the urban administration of the city. Emphasis
is placed on analysing how the people of Guangzhou began to fight for a supply
of clean drinking water once they came to realize the link between water and the
spread of the fatal cholera epidemic in 1932. Clean water, which used to be seen
as a commodity enjoyed by the privileged few, was now increasingly regarded as
a citizen’s right.
Introduction
When Paris was ravaged by a deadly cholera outbreak in 1832, Michel
Chevalier (1806–1879), a contemporary French economist, advocated
for more vigorous state control over public health. He declared that
‘the cholera. . . meant [that] public hygiene was detestable. . . The
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time has come when nations must either accept a hideous death or
else care for their bodies as they care for their minds.’ Governments,
he asserted, must concern themselves ‘with the clothing, diet,
gymnastics, and indeed the flesh of the governed’.1 The cholera
outbreak in Britain in the same year marked the beginning of the
public health movement, which likewise propagated the belief that
the government’s bureaucratic apparatus was the most capable of
imposing sanitation regulations efficiently and that the government
should thus take control of public health affairs at both national and
local level in the interest of the public good.2 As a result, the state
gradually expanded its power into the public health care arena and
assumed an increasingly dominant role in the promotion of modern
medicine. Modern hospitals were set up, sanitary infrastructure was
established, and public health acts were passed to control epidemics.
The enforcement of public health measures also entailed regulating
public behaviour. The history of public health, therefore, is interwoven
with epidemic outbreaks, the development of modernity, state-making
processes, and discipline of the body.
According to Carol Benedict, the plague epidemic that originated
in Yunnan in the eighteenth century and spread across China in the
late nineteenth century generated similar responses: in Manchuria,
the state began to get involved in ‘policing the sick’ and monitoring
public health, with the introduction of state medicine in the 1900s.3
However, her study also shows regional variation in the management
of the plague outbreak. Guangzhou displayed a high degree of ‘civic
activism’, whereby charitable halls (shantang) rather than the state
played the most active role in providing medical care for patients.4
Did the Guangzhou government, which had been strongly influenced
by the Western model of public health since the founding of the
Republic in 1912, respond to epidemics differently to the way in which
the Imperial government handled the plague outbreak in 1894? This
paper will address this question by examining the large-scale cholera
outbreak of 1932.
1 Quoted from Francois Delaporte, Disease and Civilization: The Cholera in Paris, 1832,
trans. Arthur Goldhammer, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1982, p. 199.
2 Joan Lane, A Social History of Medicine: Health, Healing and Disease in England, 1750–
1950, London, Routledge, 2001, pp. 145–48.
3 Carol Benedict, ‘Policing the Sick: Plague and the Origins of State Medicine in
Late Imperial China’, Late Imperial China, 14 (2), 1993, pp. 60–77.
4 Carol Benedict, Bubonic Plague in Nineteenth-Century China, Stanford, Stanford
University Press, 1996, pp. 133–35.
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Along with the establishment of the Department of Public Health
in 1912, the implementation of public health policies became an
integral part of city management in Republican Guangzhou. Yet
the cholera outbreak of 1932 fully exposed the weaknesses of the
medical and sanitary infrastructure of the city. Due to the Guangzhou
government’s inaction, in the early stage of the epidemic the Fangbian
Hospital, a local charitable hall founded in response to the bubonic
plague of the 1890s, involuntarily took over the major responsibility
for providing medical services for cholera patients. The government-
run hospital started to take a more active role only after the death
of hundreds of patients and Guangzhou being described as a ‘city of
horror’ in the local press. Epidemics have always served as catalysts
for change in public health perceptions and practices. This paper
attempts to explain how the cholera epidemic of 1932 changed the
role of public health in the urban administration of the city. There
is an emphasis on analysing how the people of Guangzhou began to
fight for a clean supply of drinking water once they came to realize the
link between water and the spread of the fatal 1932 cholera epidemic.
Clean water, which used to be seen as a commodity enjoyed by the
privileged few, was now increasingly regarded as a citizen’s right. The
expansion of state power into the provision of public health care was
thus both a top-down and a bottom-up process. Public health crises
such as epidemics, on the one hand, drove the political authorities to
police the sick with state medicine and, on the other hand, prompted
those who survived these ordeals to reconsider the government’s role
and responsibility in public health services and infrastructure.
Perceptions and practices of public health in Guangzhou
before 1932
After the 1911 Revolution, Guangzhou, as elsewhere in China,
witnessed the emergence of a public health infrastructure in which the
government and Western medicine played an increasingly dominant
role. The local government perceived the public health domain as
an expression of its political authority and Western medicine as an
expression of modernity. However, public health is a universal concept
with a local expression. There are always gaps between perceptions
and practices caused by factors such as resources available, local power
structures, and the different agendas of the various parties involved. As
a result, Republican Chinese cities were by and large striving towards
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common goals but fell short of achieving them in similar or totally
different ways. Although a comparison between Guangzhou and other
cities is beyond the scope of this paper, the processes Guangzhou
went through may still epitomize China’s efforts and challenges in
its search for modernity in medicine and health. In this paper I will
outline the development of the public health framework in Guangzhou
from the1911Revolution to the eve of the1932 cholera outbreak. This
period can be characterized by the prevailing importance of traditional
charitable halls in the provision of medical services to the general
public and the expansion of a governmental public health system
that embraced Western medicine and whose work was constantly
hampered by a lack of funding, and the increasing hostility of modern
physicians toward traditional physicians. These trends would affect the
way in which the 1932 cholera outbreak was managed in Guangzhou.
In Guangzhou, the conviction that the government had to shoulder
most of the responsibility for providing medical care to improve public
health did not come into being until after the 1911 Revolution. There
were government-funded medical institutions in Imperial Guangzhou
such as the hospital for lepers (mafeng yuan) located on the eastern
side of the city. However, this hospital did not provide medical
treatment, and the primary purpose for its establishment had been
to separate lepers from healthy people for fear of contagion.5 During
the bubonic plague that struck Guangzhou in 1894 and subsequently
killed 100,000 people in the city, John Kerr, an American medical
missionary working in Guangzhou, complained that in ‘the great
city of Canton. . . there was no Sanitary Board, the government
adopted no sanitary or preventive measures, there was no isolation
of cases, no removal of filth or rubbish, no water supply, no system
of drainage, and. . . Chinese medicine and Chinese superstitions
had full and unrestricted sway’.6 The plague did not accelerate the
development of the Guangzhou government’s sanitary infrastructure.
On the contrary, many charitable organizations set up by local
mercantile elites before or after the outbreak of plague began to
assume a prominent role in providing medical and social services for
city-dwellers. These ‘extra-bureaucratic’ organizations, to use Mary
5 Anders Ljungstedt, A Historical Sketch of the Portuguese Settlements in China and
of the Roman Catholic Church and Mission in China, Hong Kong, Viking Hong Kong
Publications, 1992, pp. 215–16; Angela Ki Che Leung, Leprosy in China: A History, New
York, Columbia University Press, 2009, pp. 97, 101.
6 Quoted from Benedict, Bubonic Plague in Nineteenth-Century China, p. 135.
use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X12000480
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 05 Jan 2017 at 19:02:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
440 S H U K - W A H P O O N
Rankin’s term, provided medicine and burial services for free or at
an affordable price.7 Collectively known as the ‘nine charitable halls
(jiushantang)’, these organizations set up by local elites took advantage
of the political instability during and after the 1911 Revolution to
extend their influence from the social to the political realm. In the
Republican period, the relationship between the charitable halls and
the Guangzhou government, as we will see below, was both precarious
and ambiguous. On the one hand, the political authorities relied on
the charitable halls to cater for ordinary people’s welfare needs. One
the other hand, the charitable halls were occasionally subject to the
government’s financial extortion and criticisms of how they handled
medical and welfare issues.8
The 1911 Revolution brought about a new regime which began
to perceive that one of the obligations of a modern government was
to provide a public health infrastructure and an effective means of
epidemic control. In 1912, the Department of Public Health was
set up and the first-ever commissioner of health of Guangdong
province assumed office, with duties covering the registration
of medical practitioners, vaccination of smallpox, reporting of
infectious diseases, handling of dead rats, registration of deaths,
and so on. In 1920, after almost a decade of political turmoil
that followed the 1911 Revolution, a municipal government was
set up in Guangzhou and Sun Ke (1891–1973), son of Sun
Yat-sen, was appointed mayor. Educated in the United States, Sun Ke,
not surprisingly, organized the municipal government along Western
lines, setting up six bureaus—education, public health, public security,
public works, public utility, and finance—headed by Western-trained
specialists. Sun Ke held a strong belief that sanitation (weisheng)
should be an important element of urban planning and that the
city should be a healthy place for people to live. He appointed Hu
7 Mary Rankin, Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China, Zhejiang Province,
1865–1911, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1986, p. 106.
8 Benedict, Bubonic Plague in Nineteenth-Century China, pp. 133–35; Michael Tsin,
Nation, Governance, and Modernity in China: Canton, 1900–1927, Stanford, Stanford
University Press, 1999, pp. 24, 28–29, 49; Edward Rhoads, China’s Republican
Revolution: The Case of Kwangtung, 1895–1913, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,
1975, pp. 208, 247. The ‘nine charitable halls’ were Aiyu, Liangyue Guangren,
Fangbian, Guangji, Chongzheng, Shushan, Mingde, Huixing, and Runshen. See Xiong
Yan, ‘Jiushantang yu Qingmo minchu Guangzhou shehui (The Nine Charitable Halls and
Guangzhou Society in the Late Qing and Early Republican Periods)’, in South China
Research Center (ed.), Jingying wenhua (Managing Culture), Hong Kong, Xianggang
jiaoyu tushu gongsi, 1999, pp. 346–70.
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Xuanming, who received his public health education at Johns Hopkins
University in the United States, to head the Public Health Bureau.9
However, the Bureau was hampered by a shortage of government
revenue and constant changes in personnel. Hu stayed in office for
only three months, and within the 12-year period from the Bureau’s
establishment to the cholera outbreak in 1932, the head of the Bureau
changed 14 times.10 Its administrative structure was also revamped
for financial reasons.11
Management of human waste was the major concern of the newly
founded Public Health Bureau. The reason for this was not only
that proper disposal of human waste was an important component of
public health, but that human faeces generated considerable profits.
Human waste from households and public toilets in Guangzhou were
originally collected by ‘night-soil merchants’ (fenshang) of the night-
soil trade associations who would then sell it to farmers as fertilizer.
In 1930, driven by its intent to monopolize the profits of this lucrative
trade, the Public Health Bureau contracted out the collection of night
soil to a company. Facing strong resistance from the night-soil trade
associations, the government explained that the policy was adopted in
the interest of public health. First, the night-soil company would be
subject to stringent sanitary regulations in terms of when the night
soil was collected and how it was transported to designated spots.
Second, the company would be entrusted with the task of improving
the public toilets in the city. However, the company failed to deliver on
9 Hu Xuanming served as the associate secretary of the Joint Council on Public
Health Education formed by the National Medical Association of China (NMAC),
the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), and the China Medical Missionary
Association (CMMA) before he joined the Guangzhou municipal government. For
more about Hu, see Liping Bu, ‘Social Darwinism, Public Health and Modernization
in China, 1895–1925’, in Iris Borowy (ed.), Uneasy Encounters: The Politics of Medicine
and Health in China, 1900–1937, Frankfurt am Maim, Peter Lang, 2009, pp. 110–11.
10 C. T. Teng, A Review and Forecast of Public Health Administration in Canton,
Guangzhou, Guangzhoushi zhengfu, 1935, p. 8; Michael Tsin, ‘Canton Remapped’, in
Joseph Esherick (ed.), Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, Honolulu,
University of Hawai’i Press, 2000, p. 24.
11 Of the four divisions set up at the beginning—sanitation, epidemic prevention,
public health education, and statistics—the latter two were soon abolished. In 1927,
the Bureau decided to strengthen its services by restructuring itself and increasing
the number of branches to three. The branches under the new configuration were
health maintenance, epidemic prevention, and medical services. See Teng, Public
Health Administration in Canton, pp. 1–2.
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any of its promises and complaints about the poor condition of toilets
abounded.12
However, the control of infectious diseases, which was another
important concept in public health, made very little progress before
the 1932 cholera outbreak. Dr Li Shufen (1886–1966), the first
commissioner of health and a graduate of Edinburgh University,
proposed that an isolation hospital be built soon after he assumed
office in 1912. His suggestion was not heeded until Guangzhou was
struck by smallpox in 1913, prompting the government to convert
a temple into an isolation hospital to accommodate the smallpox
patients. However, the military appropriated the isolation hospital
in 1920 and turned it into a sanatorium for its officers. In 1921,
the municipal government converted another temple in the northern
suburbs into a hospital for infectious diseases. Nonetheless, the Public
Health Bureau never stopped bemoaning the poor conditions of this
hospital, pointing out that it was dilapidated and too small.13
Sanitation and public health could go nowhere without hospitals
and Western-trained medical practitioners. Although there were
hospitals and medical training schools in Guangzhou, they were
principally in Western or private hands. In fact, Western missionaries
had undertaken to advance Western medicine and train modern
medical practitioners in Guangzhou since the nineteenth century.
For example, Peter Parker (1804–1888) opened the Canton Hospital
in 1835 and founded the China Medical Missionary Society in China
in 1838, and Mary Hannah Fulton (1854–1927) of the Presbyterian
Church founded the Hackett Medical College for Women in 1905. The
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs also founded the French School of
Medicine of Canton in 1908 at the request of the governor general
12 Teng, Public Health Administration in Canton, p. 16; Guangzhou minguo ribao,
11 December 1931, p. 2:2; 8 June 1932, p. 2:1. For the importance of human waste
in public health, see Ruth Rogask, Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in
Treaty-Port China, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2004, p. 176. For details of
human waste management in Guangzhou in the1920s and1930s, see Poon Shuk-wah,
‘Minguo shiqi Guangzhou de fenhui chuli yu chengshi shenghuo (Human Waste Management
and Urban Life in Republican Guangzhou)’, Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History,
Academia Sinica, 59, 2008, p. 67–95.
13 Arthur Starling, Hong Kong Museum of Medical Sciences Society, Plague, SARS
and the Story of Medicine in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2006,
p. 135; Teng, Public Health Administration in Canton, p. 8; K. Chimin Wong and Wu
Lien-Teh, History of Chinese Medicine: Being a Chronicle of Medical Happenings in China from
Ancient Times to the Present Period, Tientsin [Tianjin], Tientsin Press, Ltd., 1932, p. 434.
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of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces.14 These medical schools
and their graduates paved the way for the expansion of Western
medicine in Guangzhou well before the formation of the Public Health
Bureau in 1920.15 However, with the gradual consolidation of the
government medical system, these Western (and thus imperialist)
medical institutions were relegated to a secondary role.16
As Iris Borowy has pointed out, ‘medicine and health [was] a means
of safeguarding political sovereignty’.17 To assert its own medical
authority, the Guangzhou municipal government opened a public
hospital in 1921 in the northwest of the city.18 Efforts were also
made to train modern medical practitioners at the government-run
Guangdong University, which was built in 1924 and was renamed
Sun Yat-sen University in 1926. As noted by J. A. Jewell, Japan
and Germany were the two most popular countries for Chinese
students to study medicine, followed by the United States, Britain,
and France. As a result, modern physicians in Republican China were
divided into two schools: the ‘German-Japanese school’ and the ‘Anglo-
American school’.19 Given the influence of German medicine, it is no
surprise that the Sun Yat-sen University’s medical school offered a
five-year curriculum modelled on that of Germany. German medical
14 See G. H. Choa, ‘Heal the Sick’ was their Motto: The Protestant Medical Missionaries in
China, Hong Kong, Chinese University Press, 1990; Florence Bretelle-Establet, ‘From
Extending French Colonial Control to Safeguarding National Prestige: The French
Medical Dispensaries in Southern China,’ in Borowy (ed.), Uneasy Encounters, p. 82.
15 For example, Liang Peiji (1875–1947), who graduated from Canton Hospital’s
medical school in 1897, founded a medical school in Guangzhou in 1908 and
opened a luxurious sanatorium in the 1920s. Another prominent example is Liang
Yiwen (1903–1991) who entered Hackett Medical College for Women in 1918 and
later became one of the top physicians in obstetrics and gynaecology in China.
See Li Yizhuang, ‘Re’ai zuguo de minzu gongyejia Liang Peiji (Liang Peiji: A Patriotic
Entrepreneur of Nationalistic Enterprises)’, Guangzhou wenshi ziliao, 35, 1986,
pp. 166, 172–75; Liwan zhengxie [Political Consultative Committee of Liwan],
‘Fuchan ke junjia Liang Yiwen (Liang Yiwen: A Specialist in Obstetrics and
Gynaecology)’, Guangzhou wenshi ziliao, 45, 1993, pp. 81–87.
16 The French School of Medicine ceased to exist when the French consul refused
to register the school with the Nationalist government in 1927. Bretelle-Establet,
‘From Extending French Colonial Control to Safeguarding National Prestige’, p. 82.
17 Borowy, ‘Introduction’, in Borowy (ed.), Uneasy Encounters, p. 28.
18 The hospital provided free outpatient services for two hours a day in the
afternoon, except during holidays. See Guangzhou shizhengfu [Guangzhou municipal
government], Guangzhou zhinan (A Guide to Guangzhou), Guangzhou, Guangzhou
shizhengfu, 1934, p. 324.
19 J. A. Jewell, ‘The Development of Chinese Health Care, 1911–49’, in S. M.
Hillier and J. A. Jewell (eds), Health Care and Traditional Medicine in China, 1800–1982,
London, Routledge, 1983, p. 45.
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practitioners were hired as professors and students had to learn
German in their first year of study. Approximately 30 students were
admitted per year. Apart from training modern medical practitioners,
the medical school also provided medical services to the poor for free.
In 1925, Sun Yat-sen University appropriated two existing hospitals
and put them under the control of its medical school, naming them
No. 1 Affiliated Hospital and No. 2 Affiliated Hospital.20
The expansion of public health and modern medicine eventually
threatened traditional medical practices. Dominated by practitioners
of Western medicine, the Public Health Bureau started to promulgate
sanitary legislation to eliminate medical practices it considered
unscientific or superstitious. In 1929, the Guangzhou government
issued a decree forbidding temple attendants from prescribing
in the name of deities (known as shenfang or xianfang) for
worshippers.21 Confrontations between Western medical practitioners
and traditional doctors occurred at the national level in 1929 and in
Guangzhou in 1930. In February 1929, a public health conference
convened by the Ministry of Health in Nanjing passed a resolution
entitled ‘The abolition of old medicine in order to clear away
obstacles to medicine and public health’, which required traditional
doctors to register with the government and take training courses
to continue their practice. Chinese medical practitioners from 17
provinces formed a national association and successfully pressed
the conference into rescinding the resolution.22 In Guangzhou, the
head of the Social Affairs Bureau, Wu Boliang, himself a Western-
trained doctor, undertook to limit the use of Chinese medicine by
imposing restrictions on charitable halls. In 1930, Wu proposed that
all charitable halls in Guangzhou that provided medical services be
required to abandon Chinese medicine and use Western medicine
20 Liang Shan, Li Jian and Zhang Kemo, Zhongshan daxue xiaoshi, 1924–1949 (A
History of Sun Yat-sen University, 1924–1949), Shanghai, Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe,
1983, pp. 62–64; Wu Xiangxiang and Liu Shaotang (eds), Guoli Zhongshan daxue
xiankuang (The Present Situation of the National Sun Yat-sen University), Taibei, Zhuanji
wenxue chubanshe, 1971, pp. 231–32; 237; Huang Shizhong (ed.), Lao Zhongda de
gushi (Stories of Sun Yat-sen University), [Nanjing], Jiangsu wenyi chubanshe, 1998,
p. 170. No. 1Affiliated Hospital, which was much larger than No. 2Affiliated Hospital,
had a capacity of 190 beds, of which 10 were reserved for the poor free of charge. The
hospital also provided free medical services in the afternoon on a daily basis.
21 Guangzhou minguo ribao, 25 April 1929, p. 5; 3 May 1929, p. 5.
22 Ralph C. Croizier, Traditional Medicine in Modern China: Science, Nationalism, and
the Tensions of Cultural Change, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 92,
133–34.
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instead. The proposal was met with strong opposition from Chinese
medical practitioners in Guangzhou, and when Wu relinquished office
in 1931, his controversial mission remained unaccomplished.23
In sum, modern medicine and a government public health system
began to take shape and expand in the early Republican period.
The municipal government established the Public Health Bureau,
set up a public hospital and a medical school to train modern medical
practitioners, and set out regulations governing the management of
human waste and the use of traditional medical practices. Dr Wu
Liande (Wu Lien-teh, 1879–1960), a prominent figure in epidemic
prevention in the late Qing and Republican periods, made a positive
comment about the public health reforms in Guangzhou in his study
published in 1932, noting that ‘public health work at Canton was
placed upon a firm basis when a municipality was established in
1920’.24 However, this assessment should be treated cautiously, as
the public health infrastructure alone does not tell the full story. The
government budget allocation to public health institutions and how
the government managed public health crises needs to be examined
in order to make a more informed judgement. In 1932, more than
50 per cent of the Guangzhou municipal government’s total public
welfare expenditure was spent on road maintenance, and 20 per cent
went to poor relief works (such as providing shelters for the needy).
Only 9.2 per cent was spent on public hospitals, and 8 per cent went
towards maintenance of the sewage system.25
The development of public health in early Republican Guangzhou
can be assessed on both the discursive and institutional levels.
Public health was no doubt a powerful discourse. The Public Health
Bureau and modern physicians were able to draw on the discursive
power of public health to wipe out traditional organizations, which
were perceived as obstacles to their assertion of authority and the
acquisition of profits. In the name of public health, the Public Health
Bureau disbanded the night-soil trade associations and seized the
profits from the sale of human faeces. The head of the Social Affairs
Bureau, himself a modern physician, tried to make illegal the use
of traditional medicine in charitable halls (though his work was
left unfinished when he stepped down). However, the Public Health
Bureau as a government institution was weak, as it was crippled by staff
23 Yuehua bao, 29 March 1930, p. 5; 20 August 1931, p. 5.
24 Wong and Wu, History of Chinese Medicine, p. 493.
25 Guangzhou Municipal Government Gazette, 396 (30 June), 1932, p. 112.
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turnover and a shortage of funding. Public health did not rank highly
on the government’s public welfare agenda. The isolation hospital, the
importance of which can only be understood in times of epidemics, did
not receive much attention. The frequent replacement of the head of
the Public Health Bureau can be interpreted as both a consequence
and a cause of its weaknesses. The cholera outbreak of1932would fully
expose the inadequacy of this public health framework, including its
lack of resources and the lack of power modern medical professionals
wielded in the government bureaucratic structure. At the same time,
however, it would provide an opportunity for these modern physicians
to assert their authority, including an escalation of assaults on Chinese
medical physicians that had started in 1929.
The cholera epidemic of 1932: explaining the disease
Though various countries across the world were ravaged by cholera
in the 1830s, the bacteria that caused it—known as cholera vibrio—
was only identified in 1884 by Robert Koch (1843–1910), a German
physician.26 It is commonly accepted that cholera originated in India
and that there were six serious cholera outbreaks around the world in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, there is a debate as
to whether it existed in China before the nineteenth century. Some
scholars argue that because huoluan (the Chinese term for cholera) is
found in ancient Chinese texts, cholera dates back to ancient times
in China. However, critics of this view argue that the huoluan referred
to in Chinese texts before the 1830s and the form of cholera that
occurred in China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are
in fact two different diseases. They contend that because huoluan
in the past generally referred to gastro-intestinal infections, colic,
appendicitis, or ptomaine poisoning, it should be distinguished from
the ‘true Asiatic cholera’ of recent times. It is generally accepted today
that the true strain of cholera first showed its virulence and epidemic
characteristic in China in 1820. The next serious outbreak occurred in
1837. Although the victims of these two cholera outbreaks displayed
symptoms similar to those of huoluan patients in the past, some
contemporary Chinese medical practitioners pointed out differences
in the nature of the two strains, offered new treatments, and adopted
26 Paul Strathern, A Brief History of Medicine from Hippocrates to Gene Therapy, London,
Constable and Robinson Ltd., 2005, pp. 302–03.
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the name diaojiaosha (literally ‘contracting the tendons of the legs’
disease) to distinguish the new form of cholera from huoluan. In the
cholera outbreak of 1862, it was estimated that one-eighth of the
population in the region of Shanghai and Songjiang died from the
disease. Yet little is known about the responses of the government and
the general populace to the cholera outbreaks in nineteenth-century
Guangzhou.27
Guangzhou was again struck by cholera in 1913 and 1921.
The Public Health Bureau responded in July 1921 by issuing ten
regulations that instructed people how to prevent infection. The first
stated that cholera was caused by unclean food, and that contaminated
food, particularly cut fruit such as watermelons, should be avoided.
The regulations also instructed people to drink boiled water and
thoroughly cook vegetables. As the disease was highly contagious,
patients should be isolated. In addition, the Public Health Bureau
proposed the temporary closure of the bathing pool on the waterfront
of the Pearl River, explaining that the river water might have
been contaminated.28 The message these policies conveyed to the
populace was that food hygiene was of the utmost importance in the
prevention of cholera, although the instruction that people should
drink boiled water and the closure of the bathing pool clearly indicate
the government’s awareness of cholera as a waterborne disease. Was
the ‘cholera discourse’ in 1921 that put the emphasis on food hygiene
rather than water hygiene a deliberate act? We will come back to
this question in the final section of this paper. In any case, the 1913
and 1921 cholera outbreaks were mild in comparison with the 1932
outbreak, and thus did not bring about conceptual and structural
changes in public health as the 1932 epidemic would do.
27 Wong and Wu, History of Chinese Medicine, pp. 106–08; Kerrie MacPherson,
‘Cholera in China, 1820–1930: An Aspect of the Internationalization of Infectious
Disease’, in Mark Elvin and Liu Ts’ui-jung (eds), Sediments of Time: Environment and
Society in Chinese History, Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998,
p.513. Lai Wen and Li Yongchen’s study of epidemics in South China in Imperial times
offers a detailed account of medical practitioners’ treatment of cholera epidemics in
the nineteenth century, but gives very little information about the responses of the
local government and community to the disease. See Lai Wen and Li Yongchen,
Lingnan wenyi shi (A History of Epidemics in Lingnan), Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin
chubanshe, 2004, pp. 696–705.
28 Inspectorate General of Customs, Decennial Reports, 1912–1921, Washington,
D.C., Center for Chinese Research Materials, Association of Research Libraries,
1969, p. 227; Guangzhou Municipal Government Gazette, 21 (18 July), 1921, pp. 22–24;
28 (5 September), 1921, pp. 6–7.
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The cholera outbreak that swept across China in the summer of
1932 ravaged many major cities, including Shanghai, Guangzhou,
Nanjing, and Tianjin. A sanitary report conducted by the Hong Kong
government and released in 1933 estimated that there were over
100,000 cases in China, with a death rate of 50 per cent.29 A study
compiled by the Japanese in the late 1930s offered different figures,
which put the total death toll at 30,898. It also stated that the hardest
hit province was Shanxi, where 6,928 people died, and that the total
number of patients in Guangdong province was slightly over 1,000,
of whom 358 died.30 It is difficult to determine the actual number of
cases, but contemporary sources show that the situation in Guangdong
was actually much worse than the Japanese study indicated. In the first
two weeks alone, 365 people died in Guangzhou; the death toll was
so high that the city ran out of coffins. Even the official newspaper
described Guangzhou as ‘a world of horror (kongbu shijie)’.31
According to the Public Health Bureau of the Shanghai municipal
government, the first occurrence of the 1932 cholera outbreak in
China was recorded in Shanghai on 26 April of that year. Sixty-five
cases were reported in Shanghai in one month. The local authorities
were vigilant for two main reasons: the Yangtze River overflowed
in 1931, and the military conflict between China and Japan, which
broke out in Shanghai in January 1932, killing 6,000 civilians and
leaving over 10,000 missing, was only just over.32 These natural and
military disasters made the city more susceptible to the outbreak of
epidemics. Second, it was unusual for cholera cases to appear as early
as April and they were regarded as signs of an imminent outbreak. The
government quickly identified drinking water drawn from Soochow
Creek and the Huangpu River as the major cause of the epidemic
and pointed out that most of those who fell victim to the disease were
workers (laodongjie) who had become infected after drinking unboiled
water. To prevent the disease from spreading further, the Public
Health Bureau launched free vaccination campaigns and started to
29 ‘Medical and Sanitary Report for the Year 1932 by A. R. Wellington, Director
of Medical and Sanitary Services’, CO 129/ 545.
30 Ko¯ain, Shina ni okeru korera ryu¯ko¯ no tenbo¯ (Prospects of Cholera Epidemics in China),
Tokyo, Ko¯ain, 1940, p. 17.
31 Guangzhou minguo ribao, 19 June 1932, p. 2:2; Yuehua bao, 26 June 1932, p. 5.
32 Christian Henriot, Shanghai, 1927–1937: Municipal Power, Locality, and
Modernization, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993, p. 94.
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examine and disinfect well water.33 By the end of 1932, more than
half a million people in Shanghai had received a cholera vaccination.
An anti-cholera unit was set up to collect up-to-date information on
the disease from different foreign concessions in the city. The city did
not hesitate to seek international assistance. At China’s request, the
League of Nations sent experts to assist in health education and in
organizing campaigns against cholera in refugee camps.34
The cholera cases that appeared in April 1932 not only aroused
the government’s attention, but also caused public alarm in Shanghai,
as explicitly demonstrated in newspaper advertisements for cholera
medicine. For example, an advertisement for a drug called Huladi
[literally ‘enemy of cholera’] appeared in Shenbao, a leading Chinese
newspaper published in Shanghai, in May 1932 and described
cholera as ‘the most terrible infectious disease in the world’. The
advertisement further warned that an outbreak was inevitable as the
Sino-Japanese war would be followed by the hot season. ‘Huliela’ (or
huyi), a term borrowed from Japanese, became increasingly accepted
by Chinese people in1932 as an equivalent term for huoluan.35 The new
names huliela and huyi carried a more intimidating connotation. ‘Hu’
in Chinese means tiger. There is a Chinese proverb—‘tan hu se bian’—
which means ‘Just talking about a tiger turns one’s face pale’. Diseases
take on new meanings when they enter new cultural environments.
Cholera in early 1930s Shanghai was perceived as a by-product of the
Japanese invasion and was depicted as a menace as appalling as tigers.
In a propaganda campaign against cholera in Nanjing, a paper effigy
33 Shenbao, 29 May 1932, p. 11. Zhongyang ribao, 3 June 1932, p. 2:3; 12 June 1932,
p. 2:3; 15 June 1932, p. 2:3. For the relationship between cholera outbreaks and socio-
economic changes in Shanghai, see Hu Cheng, ‘Xiandaixing jingji kuozhang yu liexing
chuanranbing de kuaquyu liuxing – Shanghai, Dongbei faofa de shuyi, huoluan wei zhongxin de
guancha, 1902–1932 (Modernized Economic Expansion and the Interregional Spread
of Epidemics: Plague and Cholera in Shanghai and Manchuria, 1902–1932)’, Bulletin
of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 51, 2006, pp. 91–129.
34 American Council, Institute of Pacific Affairs, ‘Memorandum on International
Cooperation in China’s Public Health’, Memorandum (Institute of Pacific Relations,
American Council), 2 (9), 1933, pp. 2–3; Wong and Wu, History of Chinese Medicine,
p. 517. According to Iris Borowy, the League of Nations started a vigorous campaign
against cholera in Shanghai in 1930, which included free vaccinations and the control
of drinking water. See Iris Borowy, ‘Thinking Big: League of Nations Efforts towards
a Reformed National Health System in China’, in Borowy (ed.), Uneasy Encounters,
pp. 210, 218.
35 Shenbao, 24May 1932, p. 13. In nineteenth century Japan, cholera was translated
into katakana as ‘korera’ and into kanji as ‘huliela’. See, for example, Toyozumi Hidekata
(ed.), Ryuko korera by¯oron (A Study on Cholera Epidemics), Tokyo, To¯kei Shoin, 1883.
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of a ferocious tiger with a human in its mouth was paraded through
the streets to convey the message that cholera, like tigers, devoured
people.36
In early June 1932, cholera cases began to occur in Guangzhou. Two
victims reportedly died within a few hours of showing symptoms.37
It is likely that the disease spread to Guangzhou via refugees and
soldiers from Shanghai. When military conflict broke out in Shanghai,
many refugees had fled to Guangzhou and were taken care of by an
organization jointly formed by several of the city’s charitable groups.
The Nineteenth Army, under the leadership of Cai Tingkai (1892–
1968) and comprising soldiers mainly from Guangdong province, was
the major Chinese force to fight in the Sino-Japanese war. Many of
them died a courageous death, and some of the surviving soldiers
returned to Guangzhou when it came to an end.38
The Guangzhou government’s 1932 anti-cholera campaigns
emphasized the importance of individual hygiene and personal diet,
as had those of the 1920s. The government extended the vaccination
campaign against cholera that had begun in early summer until the
end of June. Free vaccines were available in nine (later increased to 11)
public and private hospitals.39 In its early stages, the government and
local newspapers alike focused on cold food and drinks, particularly
fruit, as the major cause of the cholera. The authorities delivered
talks on transmission of the disease and warned people of the
danger of consuming contaminated water and food.40 However, the
government did nothing about providing clean water to the general
public. Preventive measures mainly focused on policing food safety,
such as forbidding the sale of raw fish slices, ice cream, iced drinks,
overripe and cut fruit, and so on, all of which were considered highly
susceptible to contamination by cholera bacteria.41 The rationale
behind these actions was that individual attention to personal hygiene,
36 Zhongyang ribao, 3 July 1932, p. 2:3.
37 Yuehua bao, 6 June 1932, p. 5. Hu Cheng nonetheless suggests that, as in the
past, the 1932 cholera outbreak in China spread from Guangzhou to Shanghai. See
his ‘Xiandaixing jingji kuozhang’, pp. 100–01.
38 Yuehua bao, 17 June 1932, p. 5.
39 Yuehua bao, 11 June 1932, p. 5; 14 June 1932, p. 5. Guangzhou minguo ribao,
18 June 1932, p. 2:2. The nine hospitals included the municipal hospital, No. 1
Affiliated Hospital, No. 2 Affiliated Hospital, and six private hospitals. See Guangzhou
Municipal Government Gazette, 396 (30 June), 1932, p. 86.
40 Yuehua bao, 9 June 1932, p. 5.
41 Yuehua bao, 11 June 1932, p. 5; 15 June 1932, p. 5.
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such as refraining from consuming unclean food and unboiled water,
was adequate to prevent the disease.
The press played an important role in reinforcing this individual, or
voluntaristic, conception of public health. Major local newspapers such
as Yuehua bao, an unofficial newspaper, and the Guangzhou Republican
Daily (Guangzhou minguo ribao), the mouthpiece of the Guangzhou
government, featured extensive coverage of the cholera outbreak,
including detailed descriptions of what the victims had eaten before
they showed cholera symptoms. Interestingly, many of them were
reported to have eaten fruit, lychees in particular. For example,
an odd-job man working in a local post office fell sick soon after
eating a couple of lychees. As soon as he returned home, he started
vomiting and had diarrhoea, and died within a few hours. Another man
developed the same symptoms after eating a catty (approximately 500
grams) of lychees at noon. His family called in a doctor, but treatment
proved ineffective. He died that night.42 The press started to propose
a potential link between cholera and lychees. One report stated that,
‘news about people being infected with cholera after eating lychees
appears almost everyday’,43 and another quoted a ‘prominent medical
practitioner’ as saying that ‘lychees of all kinds absorb dew and mist
in midnight. The water content in the white flesh [therefore] contains
numerous germs.’44 The claim that lychees were more likely than
other fruits to transmit diseases was unwarranted because all kinds of
fruit are equally vulnerable to contamination by germ-carrying flies.
One possible explanation for this misunderstanding is that there was
a good lychee harvest in 1932 and they became a summer delicacy for
many people in the city. However, the news reports prompted people
to avoid taking a chance and the price of lychees dropped sharply as a
result.45
The local press thus helped to form and spread a perception of
a connection between lychees and cholera that implicitly associated
cholera infection with individuals’ lack of self-control over their eating
42 Yuehua bao, 22 June 1932, p. 5. It is interesting to note that contemporary sources
believed that the 1913 cholera outbreak in Guangzhou was spread by watermelons.
See Inspectorate General of Customs, Decennial Reports, 1912–1921, p. 227.
43 Guangzhou minguo ribao, 7 July 1932, p. 2:1. For more cases believed to be caused
by lychees, see Guangzhou minguo ribao, 16 June 1932, p. 2:1; 20 June 1932, p. 4; 4 July
1932, p. 2:2.
44 Guangzhou minguo ribao, 5 July 1932, p. 2:1.
45 Yuehua bao, 21 June 1932, p. 5. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 1 July 1932, p. 3:1; 9 July
1932, p. 3:1.
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habits. As a result, individual personal hygiene was regarded as the
major, if not the only, factor in contamination. This approach is
in sharp contrast with the alternative of ‘environmental hygiene’,
which argues that good personal hygiene is far from adequate to
control epidemics and that the government should shoulder the
responsibility for safeguarding public health by improving the physical
living environment through measures such as supplying residents with
clean water. While the local governments in Shanghai and Nanjing
started to examine and disinfect well water soon after cholera cases
were first reported, the authorities in Guangzhou did not do so until
August 1932, two months after the cholera outbreak.46 In the final
section, we will examine the possible reasons for the Guangzhou
government’s strategy of downplaying the importance of water and
environmental hygiene.
Fighting the disease: charitable halls, modern medicine, and
the local community
Despite the fact that the Guangzhou municipal government began
to establish modern medical institutions offering Western medical
treatment in the early 1920s, as explained in the first section of this
paper, government hospitals did not voluntarily assume an active role
during the cholera outbreak of 1932. The isolation hospital in the
northern suburbs was too small to accommodate the huge number
of patients and the municipal hospital refused to accept any cholera
patients in the first two weeks of the epidemic, claiming that the
highly infectious disease would put other patients in the hospital at
risk.47 The private hospitals in the city did not reject patients and
instead seized the opportunity to raise their medical fees. The people
of Guangzhou, finding themselves left to their own devices, flocked to
pharmacies for whatever medicine they believed might help. A shop
owner said that he had sold over 300 doses of cholera medicine in a
single day. Western medicine was less popular, though—not because
people did not believe in its effectiveness, but because it was too
expensive.48
46 Zhongyang ribao, 3 June 1932, p. 2:3; 12 June 1932, p. 2:3; 15 June 1932, p. 2:3.
Guangzhou Municipal Government Gazette, 400 (10 August), 1932, pp. 83–113.
47 Zhongyang ribao, 28 June 1932, p. 2:2.
48 Yuehua bao, 21 June 1932, p. 5.
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When patent medicines proved ineffective, the majority of patients
were left with no choice but to seek help from the Fangbian Hospital,
a charitable hall that had been providing affordable medical services
for the poor since the late Qing period.49 Located at High Mound
(Gaogang) in the northwest of Guangzhou, the Fangbian Hospital
was founded in 1899 by local merchants to offer medical care and
burial services for the victims of the plague outbreak which first
appeared in 1894 and resurfaced intermittently in ensuing years. It
continued to operate after the plague was over and gradually developed
into the most prominent of the ‘nine charitable halls’ in Republican
Guangzhou.50 The Fangbian Hospital was widely recognized by local
residents as a reliable charity organization, as reflected by the fact
that a considerable number of poor people went there for affordable
medical services, and the hospital raised most of its revenue through
fundraising from Guangzhou people and overseas Chinese.51 Chen
Huipu (?–1947), a manager of a native bank, served as the chairman
of the hospital in the early 1930s.52
As a charitable hall, not surprisingly the Fangbian Hospital failed
to respond to large-scale epidemic outbreaks in a way that lived up to
modern public health standards. The situation was made even worse
when government hospitals shied away from their responsibilities and
the Fangbian Hospital was left to fight the disease almost single-
handed. When traditional Chinese prescriptions for curing diarrhoea
proved ineffective (as did the Western method of saline infusion), the
hospital turned to a bizarre prescription offered by someone who in
fact knew nothing about medicine. The prescription was said to have
been discovered by a mechanic who had tried it on his dying friend
when no other medicine was available. The prescription was as follows:
Put some waste yarn (which was commonly used by mechanics to clean
machines) on a tile. Place the tile over a fire and wait for the yarn to
turn to ashes before putting the ashes into boiled water and have
the patient drink it. The prescription was introduced to the Fangbian
49 Yuehua bao, 20 June 1932, p. 5.
50 Lu Yu, ‘Guangzhou de Fangbian Yiyuan (The Fangbian Hospital of Guangzhou)’,
Guangdong wenshi ziliao, 8, 1963, pp. 139–50.
51 According to the figures announced in 1933, in 1932 the Fangbian Hospital
offered medical treatment for over 20,000 in-patients, delivery services for over
3,000 pregnant women, and buried over 2,000 unattended dead. See Guohua bao,
1 September 1933.
52 Tsin, Nation, Governance, and Modernity, pp. 33–36; Guohua bao, 19November 1947,
p. 1:2.
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Hospital by one of its directors about a week after the outbreak. It was
reported that within three hours of the hospital beginning to use this
prescription, over 20 patients in a critical condition showed significant
signs of improvement in less than five minutes.53
Nevertheless, the mortality rate in the Fangbian Hospital proved
that the prescription was not as effective as was claimed. On 19 June,
five days after the prescription was adopted, of the 133 patients admit-
ted to the hospital, 61 died on the same day. From 9 June to 24 June, of
the 634 patients admitted to the Fangbian Hospital, 273 (i.e. 43 per
cent) died and only 112 were discharged.54 A newspaper gave a vivid
description of the frightening scene outside the Fangbian Hospital:
a countless number of patients are either carried in a makeshift stretcher or
toddle over with the assistance of several people [to the Fangbian Hospital]. . .
At the exit, a countless number of coffins are moved out. [The city] has run
out of corpse handlers, coffins are thus temporarily placed in trucks. . . All
coffins in coffin shops have been snapped up.55
This deplorable situation subsequently caught the attention of the
British colonial government of Hong Kong and the Health Bureau of
the central government in Nanjing. On 24 June, A. R. Wellington,
director of Medical and Sanitary Services of Hong Kong, went to
Guangzhou to investigate. He visited the Fangbian Hospital and
enquired about the prescription. A hospital director explained that
because yarn alone was not very effective, they had decided to add
edible salt to the prescription, which produced ‘unusually good’
results.56 Wellington’s response is not known.57 On 28 June, the
head of the Nanjing Health Bureau made a telephone enquiry to
the Guangzhou government about the situation in Guangzhou after
reading news stories about the high death rate in the Fangbian
Hospital. Dr He Chichang (1890–?), head of the Guangzhou Public
Health Bureau, explained that the Fangbian Hospital ‘is not a
53 Yuehua bao, 14 June 1932, p. 5; 20 June 1932, p. 5.
54 Yuehua bao, 20 June 1932, p. 4. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 25 June 1932, p. 2:2.
55 Yuehua bao, 28 June 1932, p. 1.
56 Guangzhou minguo ribao, 26 June 1932, p. 2:2.
57 It is interesting to note that the deplorable situation in Guangzhou indirectly
helped to strengthen the political authority of the Hong Kong colonial government
among the local Chinese. In an editorial printed in Wah Kiu Daily, one of the leading
Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong, the author expressed gratitude to the Hong Kong
government ‘for the preventive measures [against cholera] to protect the health of the
residents [of Hong Kong]’, which effectively prevented the epidemic from spreading
there. See Wah Kiu Daily, 28 June 1932, p. 1:2.
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formal hospital; it is merely a local charity group whose duty is to
provide medical and burial services for the poor. As for sanitation
measures such as quarantine and sterilization, the hospital has
made improvements with the advice [of the Public Health Bureau].’
He added that ‘the rumors [about the Fangbian Hospital] are
not accurate’.58 The responses of the Hong Kong and Nanjing
governments indicate that there were widespread accusations over
the Fangbian Hospital’s mismanagement of the epidemic.
To be fair, the Fangbian Hospital was not particularly ineffective if
its mortality rate is compared with those of the private hospitals that
treated cholera patients with Western medicine. A survey published
in a medical column in Yuehua bao on 24 June shows that 36 of the 70
cholera patients admitted to the private hospitals had died by 17 June.
In other words, the death rate was over 50 per cent and was seven per
cent higher than that of the Fangbian Hospital.59 However, due to the
fact that the Fangbian Hospital accepted the majority of patients who
sought admission, it also, unfortunately and unfairly, bore the brunt
of the blame due to its high death toll.
When medicine seemed powerless to help ward off the disease,
the people of Guangzhou turned to their deities. They organized
collective religious activities in the hope of getting through a difficult
time together by seeking blessing from the gods. They paraded the
images of their patron gods through the streets, believing that this
would help to purify the community and ward off evil spirits. In the
northern suburbs of Guangzhou, for example, local people took a
ritual bath and abstained from meat and wine (as acts of repentance)
before parading their patron god Dongyue (god of the Eastern Peak)
through the community. On the day of the parade, shop owners set up
shrines decorated with flowers on the street to express their reverence
for Dongyue. In some places, Daoist priests were invited to perform
exorcist rituals and distribute talismans.60 Local newspapers criticized
the people for not dealing with the disease in a modern and rational
way, describing their religious practices as ‘a stain on civilized society’
and ridiculing the people as ‘intellectually deficient’. The modern-
minded authors who penned these articles seem to have ignored the
fact that neither the government nor modern medicine had been
effective in relieving the pain and anxiety of the populace during the
58 Guangzhou minguo ribao, 29 June 1932, p. 2:2.
59 Yuehua bao, 24 June 1932, p. 8.
60 Yuehua bao, 25 June 1932, p. 1; 28 June 1932, p. 1; 30 June 1932, p. 1.
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cholera outbreak, leaving the Fangbian Hospital and horror-stricken
people to their own devices.
Where were the modern medical professionals, and how did they
see their role during the cholera outbreak of 1932? If the expansion
of public health and state medicine implies a strengthening of the
relationship between the government bureaucracy and practitioners
of modern medicine, how close was their relationship in Guangzhou
before and during this catastrophic cholera outbreak? As noted
earlier, Western-trained doctors had been recruited to work for the
government since 1912. Without doubt, the most influential person
among them was the head of the Public Health Bureau. What role
did he play in formulating the municipal government’s public health
policies? Dr He Chichang, who received his medical training in France
at the Lyon Sino-French Institute from 1921 to 1927, had been
the head of the Bureau since 1928.61 He made the decision not to
admit cholera patients to the municipal hospital for fear that the
disease would spread to other patients. However, when he saw the
number of victims increase rapidly and that the Fangbian Hospital and
isolation hospital were pushed to their limits, He Chichang decided
the government should take a more active role. The difficulties he
encountered in implementing the policies he deemed necessary to
curb the disease were huge.
In a government meeting held on 16 June, he requested that a
makeshift matshed be built to serve as a temporary hospital. Instead
of making a decision straight away, Mayor Liu Jiwen (1890–1957)
instructed He Chichang to conduct a detailed survey on the number
of patients and ordered the head of the Social Affairs Bureau to locate
suitable vacant houses to accommodate patients.62 It is not known
whether this represented a policy of procrastination or simply reflected
Liu’s failure to realize the urgency of the request. Obviously not
content with Liu’s response, He Chichang promptly sent Liu a letter
requesting that the municipal hospital be converted into an isolation
hospital to admit cholera patients. He stated in the letter that:
quarantine is of utmost importance. The current Isolation Hospital is small
in capacity and has been full. [We] have looked in every corner of the city
and cannot find any suitable houses that can be loaned [for hospital use]. If
61 ‘Liste des étudiants de l.Institut franco-chinois de Lyon (IFCL)’, <http://www.
bm-lyon.fr/trouver/Fonds_chinois/ressources/IFCL-Liste-etudiants.pdf>, [accessed
13 January 2010].
62 Guangzhou Municipal Archives, 4-01/1/215-1, p. 78.
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we don’t act quickly, more people will die and the consequence will be grave.
To protect our people is my bureau’s responsibility, and I cannot sit back and
do nothing during this catastrophe.63
He also asked for funding of 3,000 dollars to deal with the epidemic,
assuring Liu that he would produce receipts for all expenses incurred.
In the letter it is not hard to feel his anxiety and anger about the
mayor’s sluggishness in responding to the crisis.64
A turning point in the Guangzhou government’s fight against the
epidemic occurred on 21 June. More than two weeks after the cholera
outbreak, after hundreds of patients had already died, the government
finally agreed to send all the patients in the municipal hospital to
private hospitals before turning the former into an isolation hospital.
The task was far from easy. The Public Health Bureau had to rely
on the Public Security Bureau to help escort the municipal hospital
patients to private hospitals, possibly out of fear that the private
hospitals would refuse to accept them. At about the same time, Sun
Yat-sen University’s medical school also started to admit cholera
patients to its No. 2 Affiliated Hospital.65
Surprisingly, on 22 June, just one day after the municipal
hospital began to admit cholera patients, the Medical Research
Association of Guangzhou (Guangzhou yixue yanjiu hui), founded by
medical practitioners and headed by He Chichang, announced that
it would provide ‘the most scientific’ medical treatment for cholera
patients free of charge. Comprising 29Western medical practitioners,
including doctors, pharmacists, and nurses, the Association began to
operate in early July, though the worst of the epidemic had passed.66
It is not clear why He decided to fight the cholera through his own
association when the government had agreed to admit cholera patients
to the municipal hospital. If he found the government bureaucracy’s
inaction unacceptable, why did he not take the matter into his
own hands earlier? In any case, the discord between the mayor and
the Public Health Bureau was obvious. The municipal government’s
emphasis on building a public health infrastructure since 1912 did not
necessarily mean that the Public Health Bureau and its staff exercised
the power needed to fight public health crises, although, as we will see
63 Guangzhou Municipal Government Gazette, 396 (30 June), 1932, p. 64.
64 Guangzhou Municipal Government Gazette, 396 (30 June), 1932, p. 64.
65 Yuehua bao, 20 June 1932, p. 5.
66 Yuehua bao, 22 June 1932, p. 5. Guangzhou minguo ribao, 3 July 1932, p. 2:2.
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below, crises like the 1932 cholera outbreak would eventually help the
Public Health Bureau to extend its influence.
Other Western-trained doctors also tried to exert the authority
of modern medicine by criticizing ‘non-scientific’ prescriptions for
cholera. Seeing that various Chinese medical practitioners voluntarily
made available their prescriptions in newspapers, a physician
specializing in obstetrics wrote a newspaper column in Yuehua bao
criticizing the propagation of such prescriptions, stating that the
Chinese medical practitioners involved ‘may have done this out of
kindness, but those who tried the prescriptions might have been
misled. . . They do not understand that patients who have the same
illness may vary in degree, and that the same prescription follows
different principles and serves different functions.’ He advised that
medical practitioners who wanted to do good for others should be
cautious in introducing medicine to the general public.67
The Public Health Bureau was more pointed in its criticism. A
few days after the municipal hospital started admitting cholera
patients, He Chichang sent letters to the unions of Western medical
practitioners and Chinese medical practitioners inviting them to give
their medical views on how to fight cholera. In the letter to the
traditional physicians, He criticized the Chinese prescriptions that had
appeared in newspapers, stating that ‘the ordinary people believed in
their efficacy unconditionally and used them almost as charms’. ‘The
Union of Chinese Medicine Practitioners,’ he continued, ‘is a research
institution of Chinese medicine and hence should hold responsible
for monitoring the profession.’ His much more courteous and positive
letter to the Union of Western Medicine Practitioners noted that
‘medicine is making progress everyday. Your members must have a
distinctive way of treating cholera.’68 The attitude of the Public Health
Bureau was clear. While the modern physicians were invited to share
their medical knowledge, the traditional physicians were simply asked
to shut up.
Hence, the 1932 cholera outbreak revealed the tensions between
the various parties that had developed since the emergence of the
public health infrastructure in 1912. First, the Public Health Bureau,
though an integral part of the municipal governance, had had a hard
time obtaining the resources needed to cope with epidemics from the
67 Yuehua bao, 15 June 1932, p. 5; 17 June 1932, p. 5; 21 June 1932, p. 4. Guangzhou
minguo ribao, 22 June 1932, p. 2:2.
68 Yuehua bao, 25 June 1932, p. 5.
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municipal government. Second, modern physicians had been trying
hard to reduce the influence of the resilient traditional physicians.
Given the competing agendas of these parties, their efforts to fight
the cholera epidemic were thus by no means coordinated. The whole
process was filled with contradictions, tensions, and ambivalence.
Due to the lack of relevant sources, it is not known how certain
critical decisions in the municipal government and the Public Health
Bureau were made. What is certain, though, is that the cholera
epidemic of 1932 resulted in the expansion of the government’s role
in public health and an increase in resources allocated to the Public
Health Bureau. In July, the mayor proposed sending a representative
to investigate public health facilities in Western countries.69 In August
1935, three years after the epidemic, the government approved the
construction of a new isolation hospital. The 80-bed capacity hospital
was located in Jinziwan on Panfu Road in the northwest of the city,
next to the Fangbian Hospital.70 The most far-reaching impact of the
cholera outbreak on the daily lives of the poor was the change in the
water supply system in Guangzhou.
Public health, urban administration, and the politics of water
The relationship between contaminated drinking water and the
transmission of cholera was confirmed soon after the 1854 cholera
outbreak in Britain. John Snow (1813–1858) was a British physician
whose investigation of piped water in the Broad Street area of London
eventually prompted the government to assume responsibility for
providing clean drinking water for the poor.71 Cholera outbreaks
in China in the nineteenth century likewise caused Westerners
residing in treaty ports to give serious consideration to the role
of administrators in supplying clean water. According to Kerrie L.
MacPherson’s study, after the near-epidemic of 1890 in Shanghai,
the British consul-general advocated that the private water company
should become part of the municipality and that free water be provided
to everyone in the British settlements, including Chinese people.
The consul-general explained that a free water supply ‘would not
only be a boon to the Chinese but a safeguard to ourselves as we
69 Guangzhou Municipal Archives, 4–01/1/215–2, p. 133.
70 Teng, Public Health Administration in Canton, p. 8.
71 Frederick F. Cartwright, Disease and History, Stroud, Sutton, 2004, pp. 138–41.
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cannot always expect the same immunity from epidemic disease which
we experienced last year’.72 Ruth Rogaski’s study on Tianjin also
shows that after the cholera outbreak of 1895, the British Municipal
Council started to discuss the government’s responsibility in water
supply.73 Guangzhou followed the same pattern of development after
the 1932 cholera outbreak. The difference in Guangzhou was that
the government did not take up the responsibility voluntarily. It
was not until after the populace strongly voiced its demand that the
government agreed to provide free clean water to the urban poor.
By 1932, it was a well-known fact among medical practitioners in
China that cholera was a waterborne disease. As soon as Nanjing
was hit by cholera in late May 1932, the government began to
disinfect water and spread the message in the official newspaper that,
‘Water is the conductor of cholera, it should be sterilized to prevent
infection.’ The government later announced that cholera bacteria
had been discovered in well water.74 The 1921 cholera outbreak
in Guangzhou, as explained above, also shows that the Guangzhou
Public Health Bureau was aware of the connection between cholera
and polluted drinking water. However, at the beginning of the 1932
cholera outbreak, the Guangzhou government, just as it had done in
1921, placed the emphasis on people’s unhealthy eating habits as the
major cause of cholera infection. It is not unreasonable to postulate
that the importance of water hygiene was downplayed because the
government was neither capable nor willing to take responsibility for
providing clean water to the populace, and the Public Health Bureau
did not have the authority to change the government’s water policy,
which positioned clean water as a commodity and not a right.
It was not until 20 June 1932, when the municipal hospital finally
agreed to accept cholera patients, that the Public Health Bureau began
to send staff to examine well water and urge the Public Utility Bureau
to grant permission to the general public to use public water taps.
It is not clear what drove the Guangzhou government to change its
policies. Interestingly, on the same day, the local official newspaper
reported a doctor as saying that many of the cholera victims came
from Upper Xiguan, a poor area in the northwestern suburbs of the
city, mainly because the well water there was contaminated and
72 Quoted from Kerrie L. MacPherson, A Wilderness of Marshes: The Origins of Public
Health in Shanghai, 1843–1893, New York, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 121.
73 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, p. 211.
74 Zhongyang ribao, 3 June 1932, p. 2:3; 21 June 1932, p. 2:3.
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the inhabitants of the area were too poor to afford running water. The
doctor further urged the Public Health Bureau to request that the
waterworks company install water taps in the area and open them for
public use during specific time slots.75
This was, however, a belated response to the catastrophic cholera
outbreak. The Public Health Bureau undoubtedly appreciated the
importance of a clean water supply in preventing the spread of the
disease, but clean running water was an expensive commodity and its
supply was controlled by the Running Water Management Committee
(hereafter the Water Committee), a quasi-government organization.
At the request of the Public Health Bureau, the Public Utility Bureau
asked the Water Committee to provide running water for public use.
Three public water taps were subsequently installed in Upper Xiguan
and the Water Committee promised to install more water taps for
public use if necessary.76
In reality, the Water Committee was far from willing to open
water taps for the poor free of charge. Founded in 1905 as one
of the ‘new policy’ reforms implemented by Governor-General Cen
Chunxuan (1861–1933), the Guangzhou waterworks company raised
over half of its capital from the private sector by issuing shares. The
waterworks, known as the Zengbu Waterworks, was located in Zengbu
in the northwestern suburbs of Guangzhou, and the water was drawn
from the adjacent Zengbu River. The waterworks company became
a completely private enterprise in the early Republican era when
the government sold all its shares to local merchants. Because the
company was accountable to its shareholders, its water served only
areas that could afford it, such as the Xiguan district, a commercial
region where rich merchants lived. In 1928, a new water plant was
built in the Dongshan district, a newly developed area in the eastern
suburbs where numerous returned overseas Chinese and top officials
resided. In 1929, the municipal government took over the waterworks
company, restructured its committee, and raised the price of water tre-
mendously, but promised that the tariff would decrease within a year.77
75 Guangzhou minguo ribao, 20 June 1932, p. 2:2.
76 Guangzhou minguo ribao, 22 June 1932, p. 2:2.
77 Tsin, ‘Canton Remapped’, pp. 24–25; Deng Guangxia, Guangzhoushi zhi zilaishui
(Running Water in Guangzhou), Guangzhou, Guangzhou Municipal Government, 1934,
pp. 1–22; Ye Shuming, Guangzhou jiushi (Past Events of Guangzhou), Guangzhou, Nanfang
ribao chubanshe, 1999, pp. 93–99. The Zengbu Waterworks, now known as the Xicun
Waterworks, is still operating and provides over 40 per cent of the water consumed
by the people of Guangzhou. See Guangzhou baike quanshu bianhui weiyuanhui,
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The company’s change from private to public ownership did not
alter the fact that it had to pay dividends to its shareholders on an
ongoing basis or that water pipes were laid only in well-off areas such
as Xiguan and Dongshan. Drawn from the Zengbu River, located
upstream from the city and thus relatively free from potential sources
of contamination, the running water then went through the processes
of filtration and chlorination, and was therefore of much better quality
than the water drawn from wells and rivers within the city. Hence, a
clean water supply was a privilege enjoyed by only the upper strata
of society. Even the Water Committee admitted in late 1931 that
because of its high price, the use of running water was not common in
Guangzhou. After a cut in water fees in 1931, the number of registered
households increased by 3,290 in the following year. However, the
proportion of residents using running water was still low. In 1932, the
population of Guangzhou was estimated at about one million; only
36,800 households were registered for a running water supply. If each
household comprised five people on average, the water company was
serving about 184,000 people in Guangzhou, less than one-fifth of the
total population. The remaining 80 per cent of the people were left
with no choice but to rely on rivers and wells in the city for a supply of
water. (There were about 560 wells in Guangzhou.)78
Was the disinfection of well water an alternative to the provision
of running water? If yes, did the Guangzhou government do anything
in this regard? It did not announce its plan to examine well water
and to close the contaminated wells until 20 June. It was only after
the cholera had subsided that the government began to distribute
water disinfectants to residents in Honam, where running water was
not available. Unfortunately, sources relating to the water wells in
Guangzhou are scarce. From the limited sources that do exist, we
know that well water in Guangzhou was generally of poor quality. Li
Shufen, the first commissioner of health in Republican Guangdong
once commented that, ‘none of the wells [in Guangzhou] is clean.
Most of them are not deep, and there are always sewers, seeping
wells and public latrines nearby.’ He concluded that well water in
Guangzhou baike quanshu (Guangzhou Encyclopedia), Beijing, Zhongguo dabaike quanshu
chubanshe, 1994, pp. 748–49.
78 Deng, Guangzhou shi zhi zilaishui, pp. 1–22, 36; Guangzhou minguo ribao, 11
December 1931, p. 2:2; Edward Bing-Shuey Lee, Modern Canton, Shanghai, The
Mercury Press, 1936, pp. 66–67; Guangzhou Municipal Government Gazette, 400 (10
August), 1932, pp. 128–44; 401 (20 August) 1932, pp. 93–113.
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Guangzhou was not usable.79 Not to use well water did not seem to be
a viable option. Why did the Guangzhou government not help disinfect
well water during the cholera outbreak? A possible explanation is
that Guangzhou was running out of water disinfectants at that time.
It was reported that the waterworks used an extra amount of chorine
to ensure that its running water was clean. As a result, the stock in
Guangzhou was used up, and the stock they ordered from Shanghai
had yet to arrive. The waterworks turned to bleaching powder as a
last resort, even though it gave the water a strong odour.80
The cholera epidemic of 1932 exposed the social inequality that
existed in terms of access to a clean water supply (and perhaps
also access to water disinfectants). In the administrative report of
the Public Health Bureau for the year 1932, the government finally
admitted the importance of clean water in fighting cholera. It openly
acknowledged that, ‘although there are various factors contributing
to the spread of cholera, drinking water is the most crucial one.
The improvement of drinking water is thus a pressing issue.’81 This
reflected a marked change from the earlier cholera discourse that laid
the stress on food hygiene. Due to the change in the cholera discourse,
and equally—if not more importantly—the terrible ordeal they went
through in the summer of 1932, Guangzhou people’s perception of
water and its place in urban administration also changed. Clean water,
which used to be regarded as a commodity, began to be seen as a right
for all citizens. At the municipal council meeting (canyihui) held in
December 1932, two councillors raised the water problem and linked
it to the cholera outbreak in June. One of them contended that, ‘most
of the cholera patients were poor people because their drinking water
was not clean. . . [The government] should install more public water
taps so that [the general public] can enjoy clean water and will not be
easily infected with epidemics.’ He proposed the installation of a public
water tap on every street in poor residential areas, which would supply
water for six hours a day, three hours in the morning and three hours in
79 Li Shufen, ‘Weisheng ji Guangdong weisheng zhi xingzheng (Health and Health
Administration in Guangdong)’, quoted in Zhou Ruikun, ‘Gonggong weisheng yu
Guangzhou chengshi xiandai hua, 1901–1930s (Public Health and the Modernization
of Guangzhou, 1901–1930s)’, MPhil thesis, National Chengchi University, 2003,
pp. 49–50.
80 Huazi ribao, 25 June 1932, p. 2:2. The news report does not specify the ingredients
in the bleaching powder the waterworks used.
81 Guangzhou Municipal Government Gazette, 415 (10 January), 1933, p. 64.
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the afternoon.82 Another councillor declared that many of the cholera
patients were residents of the Honam district and that the main reason
they were disproportionately represented was because the rivers in
the district from which local residents drew their drinking water were
seriously polluted. According to him, the rivers were overflowing with
garbage, sewage discharged from factories, human waste from boat
people, and even animal and human bodies. He further questioned
why the residents of Honam, who ‘are also citizens [shimin] and should
have the same treatment’,83 were denied the right to enjoy a clean
water supply.
Although providing poor people with clean drinking water for the
sake of public health increasingly came to be seen as a government
obligation after the 1932 cholera outbreak, the debate over whether
the government was doing enough continued. In June 1933, a
local executive committee of the Nationalist Party questioned the
government on whether the 20-odd public water taps in the city
were supplying water. It is highly likely that the committee had
received complaints from residents that the water taps had been cut
off. The government denied the accusation and instructed the Water
Committee to install more public taps one month later. In 1934, 33
public water taps were installed in various districts of Guangzhou,
the exception being the Honam district where the water plant was
yet to be built. Here, the Health Bureau announced that it would
distribute water disinfectants to appease the residents of the district.
Nevertheless, even the municipal government admitted that the public
taps might not be appropriately located. An official publication on
water supply published in 1934 stated that ‘changes [in the locations
of taps] need to be made after the government has found out where
poor people mostly live’, and that an investigation conducted by the
Social Affairs Bureau was under way. When the supply of water became
an integral part of urban administration, the problem of water misuse
also arose. The government discovered that some people were selling
not only water obtained from public taps, but even the metal removed
82 The Municipal Council was an elected self-governing body. In 1933, the
Municipal Council of Guangzhou comprised 70 elected councillors. Twenty-four
of them represented their occupational groups and the remaining 46 councillors
represented the 23 districts of Guangzhou, with each of the districts represented by
two elected councillors. The council was convened every six months. Yuehua bao, 20
November 1933, p. 5. Guangzhou Municipal Archives, 4-01/2/2, p. 144.
83 Guangzhou Municipal Archives, 4-01/2/2, pp. 88, 91.
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from the water taps, and had to issue a proclamation to forbid the
practices.84
Due to the lack of detailed studies concerning the development
of a water supply in other cities of Republican China in relation
to their response to cholera outbreaks, this paper is not able to
examine Guangzhou from a comparative perspective in a more in-
depth manner. It is, however, important to note that supplying
ordinary people with clean water for free, or at an affordable price,
was neither a simple nor a smooth process, even in Western countries.
Anne Hardy’s study illustrates that John Snow’s argument about the
link between cholera and water proposed in 1849 was not accepted
until 1854. However, even after 1870, people living in poor districts
and even in some wealthier areas in London still faced the problem of
a limited supply of water.85 Sometimes it was the local authorities that
did not feel a sense of urgency to improve water supply. In Hamburg,
Germany, as demonstrated by Richard Evans, the authorities were
divided over whether a modern water filtration plant was necessary
even after the cholera outbreaks of 1832 and 1848. As a result,
the city was ill-equipped when it was devastated by cholera again
in 1892.86 In short, a so-called modern medical infrastructure and
medical knowledge of the connection between cholera and water did
not necessarily prepare ordinary people and political authorities to
respond well to cholera epidemics. We should not lose sight of the
importance of local dynamics in shaping people’s responses, such as
the resources available, local power structures, and the different and
even competing agendas of the various parties involved.
Conclusion
In his study on cholera outbreaks in China, MacPherson argues
that ‘the emplacement of the medical and sanitary infrastructure
of Chinese cities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was to
a great extent prompted by “ordinary and extraordinary epidemics”
84 Guangzhou Municipal Government Gazette, 430 (10 June), 1933, p. 86; 433 (10 July),
1933, pp. 59–60; 472 (10 August), 1934, p. 118; 477 (30 September), 1934, p. 93;
532 (10 April), 1936, pp. 115–16.
85 Anne Hardy, ‘Water and the Search for Public Health in London in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries’, Medical History, 28 (3), 1984, pp. 271–72.
86 Richard J. Evans, Death in Hamburg: Society and Politics in the Cholera Years, 1830–
1910, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, pp. 144–60.
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such as cholera’.87 The cholera outbreak of 1932, which severely tested
the medical structure and water supply system, demonstrates the
impact of epidemics on public health perceptions and practices in
Guangzhou. First, it helped modern medical professionals to advance
their influence and interests. The Public Health Bureau, which failed
to gain the resources it needed to fight the cholera outbreak in 1932,
managed to have its isolation hospital expanded in 1935. Second, the
public’s perception of cleanliness also changed. The general public
started to understand that drinking water had to be clean and that
the government ought to shoulder the responsibility for providing the
general public with clean drinking water. The 1932 cholera outbreak
consequently widened the scope of urban administration to meet this
new public expectation.
A question arises: the death toll of 1932 seems insignificant when
compared with the estimated 100,000 people who died from the
bubonic plague in Guangzhou in the late nineteenth century. Why
then did it have a much greater impact than the bubonic plague of the
late Qing period on the long-term development of public health? To
say that the Qing government was incompetent and unresponsive to its
subjects’ needs hardly suffices as an explanation. This paper shows that
at the beginning of the cholera outbreak, the Guangzhou municipal
government did not respond in a more competent and responsive way
than its Imperial counterpart had done, leaving the Fangbian Hospital,
an old-fashioned charitable hall, to struggle with the disease all by
itself. Nevertheless, the founding of the municipal government and the
Public Health Bureau in 1921—and the ensuing public health projects
they initiated and saw through—did help to spread the concept of
public health among the people of Guangzhou, who started to expect
the government to become involved in health care. The modern media
no doubt played a significant role, too. The extensive coverage of
the cholera outbreak in newspapers, ranging from those that laid
the blame for spreading the disease on lychees to those that raised the
water issue, affected the way in which ordinary people responded to
the epidemic. The 1932 cholera outbreak eventually contributed to a
change in the state–societal relationship by raising public expectations
of the government’s role in urban administration. In turn, this greater
expectation led to the government becoming increasingly involved in
shaping city life.
87 MacPherson, ‘Cholera in China, 1820–1930’, p. 515.
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